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REJECTING THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE: 
SILENCE ABOUT DEPORTATION MAY OR MAY NOT VIOLATE 
STRICKLAND’S PERFORMANCE PRONG 
INTRODUCTION 
Every fall, it happens in America.  A college freshman, on his own for the 
first time, busts “the dope moves;” he “bust[s] the stupid moves.”1  And he is 
busted with a thirty-five gram bag of marijuana. 
The state charges this student with class A misdemeanor possession of 
marijuana.2  If convicted, his sentence could be a year in prison.3  To avoid 
prison time, his attorney works out a deal: he pleads guilty and in exchange 
receives a suspended imposition of sentence and one year of probation.4  
Before accepting the plea, the court runs through its normal questions to ensure 
that his plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligently made as required by the 
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.5 
After this young man completes his probation, the court then terminates 
the case pursuant to a rehabilitative statute.6  For most, the matter would be 
closed.  But this young man’s attorney busted some really stupid moves.  
Although she knew her client was a Canadian citizen and a U.S. Lawful 
Permanent Resident (LPR)7 alien, she never bothered to check or advise her 
client about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.  Her client will 
now certainly be removed; he just pled guilty to a deportable offense.8 
 
 1. FRESH (Miramax Films 1994).  During the last five years for which statistics are 
available, more than one-third of college students reported having used marijuana in the last year.  
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drug Use, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/ 
du.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 2. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 195.202.3 (2000). 
 3. See, e.g., id. § 558.011.1(5) (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 4. § 195.017.2(4)(u)(2000 & Supp. 2005); § 195.202.2–3 (2000).  Instead of sentencing a 
defendant, a court may suspend the sentence and place the accused on probation.  § 557.011.2(3) 
(2000). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 6. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 610.105 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 7. A “green card” holder.  United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Green Card 
(LPR), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (Follow “Permanent Residence (green card)” 
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 8. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000).  Throughout this note, “deportation” and “removal” 
are used interchangeably.  Most people are more familiar with the term “deportation 
proceedings,” but the correct term is “removal proceedings.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2000). 
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Aliens who unknowingly pled guilty to deportable offenses have generally 
pursued two lines of attack.  Some attempt to withdraw their guilty pleas by 
asserting that due process required the trial court to question and inform them 
about the immigration consequences of the pleas.9  Others challenge their 
convictions by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.10 
The first line of attack has always failed—no jurisdiction has ever held that 
trial courts must inform defendants about any “collateral consequences” of 
their pleas, including deportation.11  Similarly, in most jurisdictions, an 
attorney’s failure to advise her client is not a cognizable claim either.12  Only 
one jurisdiction, New Mexico, has departed from this line of reasoning and 
concluded that an attorney’s failure to advise an alien defendant of the 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea may violate his Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel.13 
Recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court disentangled the collateral 
consequences doctrine’s due process origins from the Sixth Amendment 
analysis.14  In State v. Paredez, the court determined that deportation continues 
to be a collateral consequence of conviction that trial courts need not address.15  
According to New Mexico’s high court, however, a collateral consequence 
exception to ineffective assistance of counsel claims is inconsistent with 
Supreme Court precedent.16  Ironically, the court failed to follow that same 
precedent when it announced the bright-line rule that an attorney’s failure to 
advise her client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea is 
categorically unreasonable.17  Instead, the New Mexico Supreme Court should 
have found that an attorney acts unreasonably when she does not inform her 
client about immigration consequences that might influence his decision to 
plead guilty or go to trial. 
This Comment first explains the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.  
Part II discusses the due process requirement that a plea be voluntary and 
intelligent and the emergence of the collateral consequences doctrine as an 
exception to that rule.  Part III then examines the Sixth Amendment’s 
requirement that all criminal defendants be provided with effective assistance 
 
 9. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242−43 (1969) (noting that courts should make 
sure the accused fully understands the consequences of a plea). 
 10. Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 53, 58 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 671, 687 (1984). 
 11. See infra notes 40−52 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 70−76 and accompanying text. 
 13. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004). 
 14. Id. at 803–04. 
 15. Id. at 803. 
 16. Id. at 804. 
 17. Id. 
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of counsel, observing that many courts apply the collateral consequences 
doctrine to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, but several include 
exceptions for misadvice or equivocal advice.  Part IV describes State v. 
Paredez, which evaluates the collateral consequences doctrine in both the due 
process and ineffective assistance of counsel contexts.  Part V asserts that New 
Mexico correctly determined that deportation follows criminal conviction as a 
collateral, rather than direct, consequence.  The Comment then argues that 
courts, including the New Mexico Supreme Court, have illegitimately replaced 
Strickland’s case-by-case reasonableness analysis with bright-line rules.  The 
author then proposes a workable standard and evaluates three scenarios facing 
criminal defendants using that standard. 
I.  THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF GUILTY PLEAS 
More than twenty million aliens live in the United States.18  While the 
overwhelming majority of aliens are law-abiding members of society, tens of 
thousands brush with the law each year.  As a result, the government currently 
removes (deports) almost ninety thousand “criminal aliens” a year.19  Over 
eighty thousand of them plead guilty to deportable offenses.20 
From 1984 to 2002, the number of deportations for criminal convictions 
increased seventy-one times.21  This rapid increase is due, in part, to draconian 
 
 18. As of 2003, the government estimated that 11.5 million Lawful Permanent Residents 
resided in the United States.  NANCY F. RYTINA, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,  ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION AND 
POPULATION ELIGIBLE TO NATURALIZE IN 2003 3 (Jan. 2005), available at http://uscis.gov/ 
graphics/shared/statistics/publications/EstimateLPR2003.pdf.  The government estimates that an 
additional seven million aliens resided in the United States illegally.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT 
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000 1 (2003), available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/Ill_Report_1211.pdf.  The U.S. Census 
Bureau estimates that an additional 500,000 illegal immigrants enter the country each year.  
Center for Immigration Studies, Current Numbers, http://www.cis.org/topics/current 
numbers.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 19. MARY DOUGHERTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2004 1 (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/AnnualReportEnforcement2004.pdf. 
 20. In 2002, ninety-five percent of criminal convictions in state courts were obtained through 
guilty pleas.  MATTHEW R. DUROSE &  PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY 
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002 1 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf.  In federal court during 2003, ninety-six percent of convictions resulted from 
guilty pleas.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF 
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2, 59 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
cfjs03.pdf. 
 21. Anne M. Gallagher, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: A Primer on 
What Crimes Can Get Your Client Into Trouble, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW 
HANDBOOK 166, 166 (2004–2005). 
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changes in the immigration laws.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)22 and the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)23 greatly expanded the list of 
deportable offenses.24  Crimes of moral turpitude,25 aggravated felonies,26 
certain firearm offenses,27 and crimes of domestic violence28 are among the 
offenses that warrant deportation.  Conviction for all drug crimes,29 except 
possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana,30 also results in an alien’s 
removal, even if he has been a lawful resident of the United States since 
infancy.31 
At the same time AEDPA and IIRIRA broadened the class of deportable 
crimes, the laws eliminated all discretion that immigration judges previously 
had to waive deportation for many offenses; removal now follows as a matter 
of course.32  An alien may only prevent removal by vacating his conviction 
based on a procedural or substantive flaw in the underlying proceedings.33  
Convictions vacated on ameliorative (i.e., to avoid deportation) or 
rehabilitative (i.e., probation completed) grounds remain “convictions” for 
immigration purposes and therefore continue to warrant deportation.34 
 
 22. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 24. Gallagher, supra note 21, at 166. 
 25. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2000).  A crime of moral turpitude involves “conduct 
which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality.”  
Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994), aff’d 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995).  Such 
crimes include aggravated assault, child abuse, rape, statutory rape, arson, fraud, receipt of stolen 
property, and bribery.  IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 52−57 
(8th ed. 2002). 
 26. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000).  Aggravated felonies include murder, rape or 
sexual abuse of a minor, trafficking in controlled substances, offenses relating to explosives and 
firearms, theft or burglary offenses in which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one 
year, fraud or deceit in which the victim’s loss exceeds $10,000, and crimes of violence for which 
the term of imprisonment imposed, regardless of any suspension of sentence, is at least one year.  
§ 1101(a)(43)(A)–(G); KURZBAN, supra note 25, at 122−33. 
 27. § 1227(a)(2)(C). 
 28. § 1227(a)(2)(E). 
 29. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Rob A. Justman, Comment, The Effects of AEDPA and IIRIRA on Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel Claims for Failure to Advise Alien Defendants of Deportation Consequences of 
Pleading Guilty to an “Aggravated Felony”, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 701, 731 (2004). 
 32. See id. at 701–08 (discussing how AEDPA and IIRIRA eliminated discretionary relief 
for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies under section 212(c) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act).  Under pre-AEDPA law, aliens convicted of drug offenses were also eligible for 
a discretionary waiver of deportation.  I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293 (2001). 
 33. In re Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003). 
 34. Mark T. Kenmore, Getting Comfortable with Post-Conviction Relief, in IMMIGRATION & 
NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 197, 202 (2004).  A narrow exception exists for aliens placed 
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II.  DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT A GUILTY PLEA BE VOLUNTARY, KNOWING, 
AND INTELLIGENTLY MADE 
Due process35 requires trial courts to explain certain consequences of 
criminal convictions to the defendant and ensure that all pleas are entered 
voluntarily.36  This is necessary because when a defendant pleads guilty, he 
waives several constitutional rights.37  For a waiver of these rights to be 
constitutionally valid, the waiver must be “an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.”38  Therefore, the waiver must be 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.39 
A. The Development of the Collateral Consequences Doctrine 
A waiver qualifies as voluntary, knowing, and intelligent only if it was 
made “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
 
into immigration proceedings in the Ninth Circuit.  Id. at 200; see also Lujan-Armendariz v. 
I.N.S., 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that first-time drug offenders who take advantage of 
state rehabilitative schemes and would otherwise be eligible for relief under the Federal First 
Offender Act are not “convicted” for purposes of deportation).  The Board of Immigration 
Appeals and each other circuit to address the issue have rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach.  
See, e.g., Resendiz-Alcaraz v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004); Acosta v. 
Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Salazar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 235 (BIA 2002). 
 35. The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
states that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
 36. See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (vacating defendant’s 
conviction because the trial judge did not question the defendant as to the voluntary nature of his 
plea).  In McCarthy, the Court based its decision on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and explained that those rules exist to protect the defendant’s due process rights.  
Priscilla Budeiri, Comment, Collateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas in the Federal Criminal 
Justice System, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 157, 166 (1981); Guy Cohen, Note, Weakness of the 
Collateral Consequences Doctrine: Counsel’s Duty to Inform Aliens of the Deportation 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1094, 1105 (1993); see also Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (reversing defendant’s conviction because the record contained no 
evidence that defendant intelligently and knowingly pled guilty). 
 37. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.  By admitting guilt, the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment 
right against compulsory self incrimination.  Id.  This Fifth Amendment right applies to the states 
via the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).  The defendant also 
waives his Sixth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury and to confront his accusers.  Boykin, 
395 U.S. at 243. Trial by jury and the right to confront the witnesses against the defendant are so 
fundamental to the American system of justice that the Fourteenth Amendment protects these 
rights in state courts.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400, 403 (1965). 
 38. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
 39. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11(b) (2005); Budeiri, supra note 36, at 165–66; Cohen, supra note 36, at 1105–06. 
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consequences.”40  Not every circumstance or consequence appears to be 
relevant—the Supreme Court stated that a defendant must be “fully aware of 
the direct consequences” of his plea.41  Most courts have interpreted this 
language to mean that the defendant need know only the “direct” consequences 
of his plea; he need not know about any “collateral” consequences.42 
Direct consequences have “a definite, immediate and largely automatic 
effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.”43  Consequences affecting 
the maximum term of imprisonment, such as when a sentence commences and 
ineligibility for parole or mandatory special parole terms, are deemed 
“direct.”44  Unlike direct consequences, “collateral” consequences remain 
“beyond the control and responsibility of the district court in which [the] 
conviction was entered.”45  Collateral consequences are not necessarily minor 
consequences.  They include loss of the right to obtain a passport, to serve on a 
jury, loss of business licenses, deportation, and civil commitment.46  
Frequently, collateral consequences result in more significant hardship than 
direct consequences.47  For example, most people would probably consider 
certain collateral consequences such as indefinite civil commitment48 or 
permanent removal from the United States49 to be more severe than a short 
prison sentence. 
 
 40. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
 41. Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (rev’d 
on confession of error on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)) (emphasis added); Gabriel J. Chin & 
Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 
87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 728 (2002). 
 42. Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 728; see, e.g., United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 
922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curium) (It is “well settled that, before pleading, the defendant need not 
be advised of all collateral consequences of his plea.”); Johnson v. United States, 460 F.2d 1203, 
1204 (9th Cir. 1972) (“We presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it used the 
word ‘direct’; by doing so, it excluded collateral consequences.”); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent  
Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1365 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 43. United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 515 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Torrey v. 
Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 44. Budeiri, supra note 36, at 181–86. 
 45. See, e.g., El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United 
States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000)); accord State v. Aquino, 873 A.2d 1075, 
1082 (Conn. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004). 
 46. Budeiri, supra note 36, at 170–77.  For an exhaustive list of collateral consequences, see 
Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 705–06. 
 47. Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 699–700; Steve Colella, “Guilty, Your Honor”: The 
Direct and Collateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas and the Courts that Inconsistently Interpret 
Them, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 305, 309 (2004). 
 48. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362−63 (1997); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 
F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 49. Budeiri, supra note 36, at 171; Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 705–06. 
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Despite deportation’s severity, each federal circuit court to consider the 
issue has found it a collateral, rather than direct, consequence of a guilty plea.50  
The federal circuits that have not yet directly considered the issue generally 
indicate that they too would reach the same holding.51  Similarly, state courts 
have reached the same conclusion.52 
III.  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEES THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that in 
all criminal trials, “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence.”53  Although initially it only applied to federal 
trials,54 the Sixth Amendment right to counsel now also attaches to state 
prosecutions.55  The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the right to 
representation during critical stages of a criminal prosecution,56 it also 
guarantees “effective assistance of counsel.”57 
Actions taken by both the state and counsel may deprive a criminal 
defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  The government violates 
this right when it interferes with the attorney’s ability to conduct the defense or 
independent decision-making.58  An attorney deprives her clients of their Sixth 
Amendment rights when she fails to provide “adequate legal assistance.”59 
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court introduced a two-prong 
test to determine if an attorney’s assistance of counsel was so defective that a 
Sixth Amendment violation occurred.60  First, the defendant must show that his 
attorney’s performance fell below that of an objectively reasonably competent 
 
 50. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 803. 
 51. Id.; see, e.g., Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1257 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004); Kandiel v. 
United States, 964 F.2d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1992).  But see United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 
190–91 (2d Cir. 2002) (indicating that arguments that deportation is no longer collateral in light 
of the fact that changes in the immigration laws are “persuasive”). 
 52. Commonwealth v. Tahmas, Nos. 105254, 105255, 2005 WL 2249587, at *2 n.5 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. July 26, 2005). 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Supreme Court considers assistance of counsel as a 
safeguard “necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.”  Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). 
 54. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963). 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335. 
 56. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). 
 57. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added). 
 58. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
 59. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980).  For example, a conflict of interest 
between the attorney and her client could so adversely affect the adequacy of counsel’s 
representation as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 359; Wood v. Georgia, 450 
U.S. 261, 272–74 (1981). 
 60. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
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attorney considering all the circumstances.61  When evaluating reasonableness, 
standards reflected by professional organizations and bar associations are 
probative but not dispositive.62  The Court explained that “no particular set of 
detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the 
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel.”63  Although counsel 
enjoys a strong presumption that her behavior is reasonable, a defendant can 
overcome this presumption.64 
If the defendant can establish that his attorney’s representation was 
objectively unreasonable, he must then establish that his attorney’s deficient 
performance prejudiced him in some way.65  To establish prejudice, the 
defendant must prove that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”66 
The Strickland test also applies when a defendant alleges ineffective 
assistance of counsel after a guilty plea.67  In Hill v. Lockhart, the Court 
explained that the defendant must first “attack the voluntary and intelligent 
character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from 
counsel” was objectively unreasonable.68  Then to establish prejudice, “the 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial.”69 
A. Application of the Collateral Consequences Doctrine to Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 
Most courts extend the collateral consequences doctrine (relating to the 
trial court’s duty to inform a defendant about the consequences of his plea) to 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.70  In most jurisdictions, an attorney’s 
failure to advise her client about the collateral consequences of a guilty plea 
cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.71  Those jurisdictions hold 
 
 61. Id. at 687–88.  The reasonableness of the attorney is based on an objective standard.  Id. 
 62. Id. at 688. 
 63. Id. at 688−89. 
 64. Id. at 688. 
 65. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 692. 
 66. Id. at 694.  Prejudice is presumed in certain circumstances such as “[a]ctual or 
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel.”  Id. at 692. 
 67. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
 68. Id. at 56–57. 
 69. Id. at 59. 
 70. Cohen, supra note 36, at 1109. 
 71. Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 703–04; Cohen, supra note 36, at 1109.  Professors 
Chin and Holmes state “all courts.”  Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 703–04.  Paredez creates 
an exception to this rule.  See infra notes 105–128. 
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that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to explain only the direct 
consequences of a guilty plea.72 
B. Ineffective Assistance and Advice Regarding Immigration Consequences 
Deportation is possibly the harshest consequence of a guilty plea.73  It may 
cause “loss of both property or life, or of all that makes life worth living.”74  In 
many cases, the immigration consequence of a guilty plea—deportation—far 
outweighs the criminal consequences.75  For example, in the scenario in the 
introduction, the youth would serve no jail time but would be separated from 
his family and friends with no way back, ever. 
Despite the severity of deportation, the majority of courts apply the 
collateral consequences doctrine to ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
where the attorney failed to advise her alien client about the risk of deportation 
upon entering a guilty plea.76  Only New Mexico recognizes that an attorney’s 
silence may violate the Sixth Amendment.77  Several jurisdictions do, however, 
recognize that immigration consequences may form part of the bargain. 
1. The Misadvice Exception 
In some jurisdictions, attorneys are not completely relieved from all 
obligations regarding the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.78  The 
courts that adopt the “middle ground” find ineffective assistance of counsel 
when attorneys misadvise their clients, leading them to believe that deportation 
will not follow.79  In these jurisdictions, defense attorneys have no affirmative 
obligation to advise defendants that a plea will result in deportation, but 
advice, if offered, must be accurate.80 
 
 72. Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 703. 
 73. Justman, supra note 31, at 732. 
 74. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
 75. Jennifer Welch, Comment, Defending Against Deportation: Equipping Public Defenders 
to Represent Noncitizens Effectively, 92 CAL. L. Rev. 541, 545 (2004). 
 76. Lea McDermid, Comment, Deportation is Different: Noncitizens and Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, 89 CAL. L. Rev. 741, 751 (2001); see, e.g., United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 
354 (5th Cir. 1993); Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Del 
Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Nikolaev v. Webber, 705 N.W.2d 72 (S.D. 2005); State v. Santos, 401 N.W.2d 856 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987). 
 77. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004). 
 78. John J. Francis, Failure to Advise Non-Citizens of Immigration Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: Should This Be Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 691, 724–25 (2003). 
 79. McDermid, supra note 76, at 754. 
 80. Francis, supra note 78, at 726; see, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187–88 
(2d Cir. 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540–41 (11th Cir. 1985); 
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This distinction between nonadvice and affirmative misadvice is 
problematic because ineffective assistance of counsel claims can only be 
brought with respect to proceedings that are covered by the right to counsel, 
and the courts that adopt the collateral consequence doctrine consider 
deportation outside the scope of ineffective assistance of counsel.81  One 
possible explanation is that courts might justify the distinction on practical 
considerations because it is “easier to prove that misadvice, rather than non-
advice” caused the alien to plead guilty.82 
2. The “Maybe” Exception 
Recently, a few jurisdictions have recognized a second exception to the 
“no obligation” rule.83  In the “maybe” exception group, an attorney’s 
performance is objectively unreasonable when she tells her client that a 
possibility of deportation exists but, in fact, deportation is a certainty.84  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit found defense counsel’s performance to have been 
deficient when he informed the defendant that deportation was “technically a 
possibility,” but “not a serious possibility.”85  Likewise, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court has held that when deportation will “almost certainly” follow 
as a consequence of a guilty plea, counsel’s advice that the plea “could” result 
in deportation was “misleading and thus deficient.”86 
IV.  A NEW BRIGHT-LINE: STATE V. PAREDEZ 
In State v. Paredez,87 the New Mexico Supreme Court disentangled 
ineffective assistance of counsel from the collateral consequences doctrine.88  
In doing so, Paredez broke ground as the first case in which an attorney’s 
 
Commonwealth v. Tahmas, Nos. 105254, 105255, 2005 WL 2249587, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 26, 
2005); Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 2004). 
 81. Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 735. 
 82. Id. at 736. This author suggests that the only possible reasonable justification for this 
distinction could be that counsel is required as a “special circumstance” under the Fourteenth and 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clauses.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) 
(concluding that due process requires appointing counsel at some parole and probation revocation 
hearings). 
 83. Some jurisdictions have rejected the “maybe” exception.  For example, in State v. Rojas-
Martinez, advice that pleading guilty to an aggravated felony “might or might not” lead to 
deportation did not qualify as misadvice.  125 P.3d 930, 933 (Utah 2005); see also Gonzalez v. 
State, 134 P.3d 955 (Or. 2006) (holding that counsel is required to advise alien clients that a 
criminal conviction could result in deportation). 
 84. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d at 934. 
 85. United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 86. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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failure to advise her client about the immigration consequences of a plea 
violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to effective assistance of counsel.89 
A. Background 
Ramon Paredez pled guilty to criminal sexual contact of a minor on a child 
thirteen to eighteen years of age.90  At the plea hearing, the defendant’s 
attorney informed the court that the defendant was a Guatemalan citizen and 
lawful permanent resident alien.91  His attorney also told the court that he had 
advised the defendant that the plea “could” have immigration consequences.92  
The district court then informed the defendant that his plea “could” affect his 
immigration status.93  The court sentenced the defendant to three years, but 
suspended the sentence and placed the defendant on probation for three 
years.94  Immediately thereafter, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea because he had not been fully informed of the immigration consequences 
of his plea.95  The district court denied the defendant’s motion, and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court was not “required to 
provide a more specific explanation of the immigration consequences of the 
defendant’s guilty plea” and that the record was “insufficient to address on 
direct appeal the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.”96 
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court first noted that the defendant 
“almost certainly will be deported back to Guatemala” as an aggravated felon 
without any opportunity for discretionary relief.97  The court observed that 
neither the district court nor defense counsel informed him that his plea would 
result in “virtually automatic deportation.”98 
B. The Court’s Duty to Inform a Criminal Defendant of the Immigration 
Consequences of a Guilty Plea 
In Paredez, the court first examined the trial court’s duty to inform 
criminal defendants about the immigration consequences of their guilty pleas.99  
The court concluded that the district court complied with the state’s rules of 
 
 89. Id. at 803–04. 
 90. Id. at 800–01. 
 91. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 801. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 801. 
 97. Id.  “Aggravated felon” is the term used for an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.  
See Justman, supra note 31, at 704. 
 98. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 801. 
 99. Id. at 802. 
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criminal procedure100 when it told the defendant that his plea “could” result in 
his deportation.101  The court then considered whether the Due Process Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution required the district court to specifically inform the 
defendant that his plea would result in his deportation rather than that it could 
result in his deportation.102 
Noting the Boykin and Brady standards that a plea must be voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligently made, the New Mexico Supreme Court observed 
that the trial court has a duty only to ensure that a criminal defendant 
comprehends the “direct” consequences of his guilty plea; it has no duty to 
inform him of the “collateral” consequences.103  Citing the First Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Gonzalez,104 the court explained: 
What renders [a] plea’s immigration effects “collateral” is not that they arise 
“virtually by operation of law,” but the fact that deportation is “not the 
sentence of the court which accept[s] the plea but of another agency over 
which the trial judge has no control and for which he [or she] has no 
responsibility.105 
The court explained that although changes in immigration law made 
deportation virtually automatic rather than merely possible, it continues to 
follow as a collateral consequence.106  The court concluded that because due 
process does not require that the trial court inform the defendant about 
collateral consequences, due process did not require the trial court to inform 
the defendant that his plea “almost certainly” would result in his deportation.107 
C. An Attorney’s Duty to Inform Clients of the Immigration Consequences of 
a Guilty Plea 
The court’s decision in Paredez that due process imposed no duty on the 
trial court did not necessarily mean that the Sixth Amendment similarly 
imposed no duty on counsel.108  The court proceeded to analyze whether 
defense counsel’s failure to inform the defendant that his plea would “almost 
certainly” result in his deportation constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.109 
 
 100. N.M. RULES ANN. 5-303 (2004). 
 101. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 802–03. 
 102. Id. at 803.  The court declined to consider an argument based on the due process clause 
of the New Mexico constitution because Paredez did not argue that the state due process clause 
should be interpreted differently than the federal due process clause.  Id. at 802. 
 103. Id. at 802–03. 
 104. United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 105. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 803 (citing Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27 (citation omitted)). 
 106. Id. at 803. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 803–04. 
 109. Id. at 804. 
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After outlining the Strickland two-part test, the court first addressed the 
deficient performance prong.110  The court agreed with the jurisdictions that 
recognize “affirmative misrepresentation[s]” as objectively unreasonable.111  
Further, if deportation is almost certain, an attorney’s advice that he “could” or 
“might” be deported misleads the client into believing he possesses some 
chance of remaining in the United States.112  Therefore, such statements also 
fall below objective standards of reasonableness.113  Instead of merely adopting 
the “maybe” exception, the court went “one step further” and announced a new 
bright-line rule: “an attorney’s non-advice to an alien defendant on the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea would also be deficient 
performance.”114 
The court acknowledged and rejected the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
Broomes v. Ashcroft115 that defense counsel’s failure to advise a criminal 
defendant about the possibility of deportation cannot be ineffective assistance 
of counsel because deportation remains a collateral consequence of 
conviction.116  The New Mexico Supreme Court rested its decision on three 
grounds.  First, the court found a tenuous distinction between nonadvice and 
misadvice.117  Misadvice that a guilty plea “might,” “may,” or “could” result in 
deportation and nonadvice regarding the immigration consequences both result 
in a defendant deciding whether to plead guilty without sufficient information 
to make an informed decision.118  Second, citing Professor John Francis’s 
article,119 the court observed that distinguishing between nonadvice and 
misadvice would “create a chilling effect on the attorney’s decision to offer 
advice.”120  Attorneys would risk being deemed “ineffective” if they chose to 
advise their clients at all.121  Finally, the court recognized that not requiring 
lawyers to advise their clients of the specific immigration consequences of 
their guilty pleas will shift the burden “to discern complex legal issues on a 
class of clients least able to handle that duty.”122  As additional support, the 
court described the American Bar Association standards for criminal defense 
 
 110. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 804. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 803–04. 
 114. Id. at 804. 
 115. 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 116. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 804. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 804–05. 
 119. Francis, supra note 78. 
 120. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805. 
 121. Id. at 805. 
 122. Id. (quoting Francis, supra note 78, at 726). 
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attorneys123 and determined that attorneys offer deficient performance unless 
they: 1) “determine the immigration status of their clients;” and 2) advise them 
“of the specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty.”124 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant 
must also satisfy the Strickland “prejudice” prong.125  In Paredez, the 
defendant needed to show that he would not have pled guilty had he been 
“given constitutionally adequate advice” about the immigration consequences 
of his plea.126  Although the court found a “strong inference” that the defendant 
would not have pled guilty had his attorney properly advised him, the court 
found the record insufficiently developed to make that determination.127  The 
court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on that issue.128 
V.  PAREDEZ REACHED THE RIGHT RESULT, BUT ANNOUNCED THE WRONG 
RULE 
New Mexico’s Paredez decision is likely to draw criticism from all sides.  
Immigrant advocates may criticize the Paredez decision because courts have 
no duty to inform defendants about the immigration consequences of their 
guilty pleas.  Anti-immigrant groups may criticize it because it means a court’s 
non-duty does not relieve attorneys from their own independent duties. 
A. Deportation is a Collateral Consequence 
The Paredez decision correctly applied the Supreme Court’s rule that due 
process requires that a defendant know the “direct” consequence of his plea.129  
Courts should not have to be aware of every possible consequence, and even 
though deportation ranks among the most draconian punishments, it still 
remains outside the scope of criminal proceedings. 
Several authors have criticized the collateral consequences doctrine’s 
application to deportation because, post-IIRIRA, deportation follows 
conviction as a matter of course.130  These arguments assert that even if 
deportation were a collateral consequence prior to 1996, IIRIRA and AEDPA 
so greatly changed the nature of deportation proceedings that it is no longer 
 
 123. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, standard § 14-3.2 (3d ed. 
1999). 
 124. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805. 
 125. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687−88 (1984). 
 126. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805 (citing Gonzalez v. Oregon, 83 P.3d 921, 925 (2004)). 
 127. Id. at 805–06. 
 128. Id. at 806. 
 129. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
 130. Melissa L. Castillo, Comment, A Duty to Warn: Representing the Non-Citizen in a 
Criminal Case [State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002)], 44 WASHBURN L.J. 627, 649–51 
(2005); Colella, supra note 47, at 323; McDermid, supra note 76, at 762. 
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collateral.131  Because immigration judges no longer have discretion to suspend 
or cancel removal proceedings, some argue that deportation follows as an 
automatic, immediate and definite consequence of a guilty plea—that 
deportation is a direct consequence.132 
There is no doubt that the 1996 laws moved deportation from a possible 
consequence to a certain or definite consequence.  The Supreme Court 
recognized this in Immigration and Naturalization Services v. St. Cyr.133  
However, St. Cyr does not support arguments that the definite or certain nature 
of deportation moved it into the “direct” category.  While the Court noted the 
“clear difference . . . between facing possible deportation and facing certain 
deportation,” the Court identified the distinction “for the purposes of 
retroactivity analysis,” and made no mention of the direct-collateral 
distinction.134 
While deportation is a definite result of a guilty plea, it is neither automatic 
nor immediate.  “Automatic” consequences require no further action from any 
government agent.135  For example, ineligibility for welfare benefits qualifies 
as automatic because the government need not take any action to suspend or 
deny an individual those benefits.136  An alien’s removal does not 
automatically follow a criminal conviction.  Instead, the alien must be issued a 
Notice to Appear,137 placed in removal proceedings,138 and ordered removed 
by an immigration judge.139 
After pleading guilty to a removable offense, deportation is a near 
certainty,140 but it does not necessarily follow immediately.  United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents have the power to issue 
detainers to other law enforcement agencies for the purpose of holding and 
arresting criminal aliens.141  In many cases, years pass between the entry of a 
guilty plea and the initiation of removal proceedings.142 
 
 131. Castillo, supra note 130, at 649–50; Colella, supra note 47, at 323; McDermid, supra, 
note 76, at 762. 
 132. Castillo, supra note 130, at 649–50; Colella, supra note 47, at 323; McDermid, supra, 
note 76, at 762. 
 133. 533 U.S. 289, 325 (2001). 
 134. Id. 
 135. United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 136. United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 137. The Notice to Appear is the immigration charging document. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2000). 
 138. 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2006). 
 139. § 1240.12(c). 
 140. See supra notes 22−34 and accompanying text. 
 141. § 287.2.  A “detainer” requests that an agency hold an alien until the Department of 
Homeland Security can assume custody.  Id. 
 142. See, e.g., Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2005) (over two years 
between plea and initiation of proceedings); United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1108−09 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (over three years between plea and initiation of proceedings); United States v. Fry, 322 
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Even assuming these arguments were correct as to the automatic and 
immediate nature of deportation, they overlook the nature of the direct-
collateral distinction.  As the court in Paredez pointed out, the direct-collateral 
distinction rests not on whether the effect occurs “virtually by operation of 
law,” but instead on whether the issuing court has control over the 
consequence in question.143  The First,144 Sixth,145 Ninth,146 and Tenth147  
Circuits, as well as several state courts,148 have reiterated that regardless of 
how automatic a consequence, if it “remains beyond the control and 
responsibility” of the sentencing court, it “remains a collateral 
consequence.”149  As the Ninth Circuit explained, “no matter what changes 
have been wrought by AEDPA and IIRIRA, removal remains the result of 
another governmental agency’s subsequent actions.”150 
B. Failure to Advise of the Immigration Consequences of a Guilty Plea May 
Be Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
When evaluating whether Mr. Paredez’s attorney provided ineffective 
assistance, the New Mexico Supreme Court properly focused on whether his 
counsel’s conduct was objectively reasonable rather than whether deportation 
is collateral or direct.  Yet the court adopted another bright-line rule: an 
attorney’s silence about the possibility of deportation is categorically 
unreasonable.  Like the direct-collateral distinction, this rule is inconsistent 
with Strickland’s case-by-case approach to evaluating ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  Instead, the court should have adopted a uniform standard that 
satisfies Strickland and yields the proper result in the nonadvice, misadvice, 
and equivocal advice categories. 
 
F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).  In other cases, the delay is several months.  See, e.g., El-
Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d  417, 420 (6th Cir. 2002) (three months). 
 143. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004) (quoting U.S. v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 
27 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
 144. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27. 
 145. El-Nobani, 287 F.3d at 421. 
 146. United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 515–16 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 147. Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 148. See, e.g., Rumpel v. State, 847 So. 2d 399, 403 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002); State v. 
Abdullahi, 607 N.W.2d 561, 567 (N.D. 2000). 
 149. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27. But cf. United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 190 (2nd Cir. 
2002) (finding arguments that deportation is no longer collateral “persuasive” and deserving of 
“careful consideration”). 
 150. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d at 516. 
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1. The Collateral Consequences Doctrine Cannot Exist Outside of 
Strickland 
Many critics correctly identify the collateral consequences doctrine as 
inconsistent with Strickland.151  In the two decades since the Supreme Court 
decided Strickland152 and Hill,153 the Court has heard many ineffective 
assistance claims.  The Supreme Court has never distinguished between 
collateral and direct consequences when evaluating those claims.154  In fact, in 
Hill, the Court declined to adopt the Eighth Circuit’s direct-collateral 
distinction and instead reiterated that the Strickland test applies to all 
ineffective assistance claims.155  In Hill, the Supreme Court did not affirm the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision on the basis of the direct-collateral distinction, as 
announced by the Court of Appeals, but rather because petitioner Hill failed to 
satisfy the Strickland test, which also applies to ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims relating to guilty pleas.156 
Unlike other areas, such as administrative law or dormant commerce 
clause analysis where different tests exist for different situations,157 the 
Supreme Court applies only the Strickland test to determine whether an 
attorney provided ineffective assistance following both trials and guilty 
pleas.158  While the Court has, at times, indicated that certain attorney acts or 
omissions are professionally unreasonable,159 Strickland requires a 
 
 151. Some criticize the use of the doctrine in general.  See, e.g., Castillo, supra note 130, at 
653; Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 709–12; Cohen, supra note 36, at 1135–36, 1143–45.  
Others criticize only its application in immigration cases.  See, e.g., Francis, supra note 78, at 
725–29; Justman, supra note 31, at 731–32, 734–36; McDermid, supra note 76, at 763. 
 152. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 153. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 154. The Court only mentions “collateral consequences” in two decisions; neither decision 
discusses an attorney’s obligations relating to collateral consequences of a guilty plea.  Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n.4 (1985); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972). 
 155. 474 U.S. 52, 55, 58 (1985).  The Eighth Circuit rejected Mr. Hill’s claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, in part because parole eligibility is a “collateral rather than direct 
consequence . . . of which a defendant need not be informed.”  Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568, 
570 (8th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 764 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 156. Hill, 474 U.S. at 55, 58. 
 157. Certain administrative actions receive deference under the standard announced in 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), while 
others deserve deference under the standard explained in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 
(1944).  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226−27 (2001).  When evaluating dormant 
commerce clause issues, the Supreme Court applies a strict-scrutiny test for discriminatory laws 
and the Pike balancing test to nondiscriminatory statutes.  NORMAN REDLICH ET. AL, 
UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 191, 200−04 (2005).  Special thanks to Professor 
Frederic Bloom for helping the author with this analogy. 
 158. Hill, 474 U.S. at 52, 57 (1985). 
 159. E.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969) (where the attorney disregarded 
specific instructions to file notice of appeal). 
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“circumstance-specific” inquiry.160  Per se bright-line rules are inconsistent 
with Strickland.161  Instead, courts must determine the reasonableness of an 
attorney’s conduct in light of the circumstances of the particular case at the 
time of the act or omission.162 
2. Is Attorney Silence Categorically Reasonable? 
The collateral consequences doctrine illegitimately replaces the case-by-
case analysis required under Strickland’s performance prong.  This bright-line 
refusal to consider collateral consequences must mean that courts find an 
attorney’s silence categorically reasonable.163  Some collateral consequences 
may be reasonably excluded from defense counsel’s radar because a 
reasonably competent attorney need not be aware of every possible 
consequence of a guilty plea.164  Others, however, are of such overriding 
importance that they cannot reasonably be ignored. 
a. Silence About Restraints on Liberty Can Be Unreasonable 
The Supreme Court has attached special significance to consequences that 
result in restraints on liberty.165  This significance is not limited to only some 
restraints on liberty—“any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter.”166  For 
example, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel in all criminal 
 
 160. Roe v. Lucio Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478 (2000). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688−90 (1984). 
 163. For example, Utah “adopt[ed] the collateral consequence rule and the affirmative 
misrepresentation exception to it” without analyzing the misrepresentation under the performance 
prong of the Strickland test.  State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930, 934 (Utah 2005). 
 164. The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee perfect advocacy; it guarantees only 
reasonable competence judged according to “prevailing professional norms.”  Yarborough v. 
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  For example, a reasonably competent 
defense counsel might not be aware that a conviction might result in the loss of her client’s 
business license.  Budeiri, supra note 36, at 171.  Furthermore, some collateral consequences, 
such as disenfranchisement, vary by jurisdiction.  In thirty-six states, convicted felons are 
disenfranchised while on parole or probation; eleven states permit lifetime disenfranchisement.  
The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement, http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
issues_03.cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).  Assigned counsel in rural areas should not be 
expected to know every collateral consequence.  In nearly half of the states, assigned counsel, 
rather than the Public Defender, represent indigent defendants at criminal trial.  U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUSTICE, NAT’L SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS, app. 6 (1999).  Overall, 
more than half of the counties nationwide rely on the assigned counsel model.  Id. at 19.  For a 
list of collateral consequences, see Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 705−06. 
 165. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972). 
 166. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373−74 (1979) (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 41 
(Burger, C.J., concurring)) (emphasis added). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] REJECTING THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE 285 
proceedings,167 yet an indigent defendant has the right to appointed counsel 
only when “the accused is deprived of his liberty.”168  In Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, the Supreme Court described the needs of indigent defendants when 
they plead guilty: 
Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of the guilty plea, a problem 
which looms large in misdemeanor as well as in felony cases. Counsel is 
needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is 
fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison.169 
An attorney performs in an objectively unreasonable manner when she 
fails to inform her client about restraints on liberty that are penal in nature, be 
they collateral or direct.170  While deportation is collateral in the sense that it 
remains outside the sentencing court’s control or responsibility,171 the 
possibility of deportation remains part of the bargain.  In Argersinger, the 
Court underscored that counsel is necessary for the defendant to be “fully 
aware” of the prospect of prison or jail time.172  Although deportation is not 
 
 167. U.S. CONST. amend VI (“[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 168. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 32.  The right to appointed counsel attaches only when the 
defendant has actually been sentenced to imprisonment, and not when fines or other punishment 
are imposed.  Scott, 440 U.S. at 373−74. 
 169. 407 U.S. at 34. 
 170. Of the numerous collateral consequences, the author believes that only civil commitment 
and deportation constitute significant restraints on liberty.  The Court considers civil commitment 
to be non-punitive because it does not implicate retribution or deterrence.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346, 361−62 (1997).  Although the Supreme Court has never held that deportation is 
penal in nature, the author believes it has a more penal nature than civil commitment because it is 
so severe and sufficiently similar to the criminal sanctions of banishment and transportation. 
  The Supreme Court uses seven factors as guideposts to evaluate whether a consequence 
is penal in nature.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).  Generally, a law is penal in nature 
when it imposes a “disability for the purposes of punishment, . . . to reprimand the wrongdoer, 
[or] to deter others.”  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958). 
  Among the factors is whether the law has historically been regarded as punishment.  
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.  Deportation, although not technically a criminal punishment, is the 
equivalent of “banishment” or “exile,” and as such, constitutes a “penalty.”  Barber v. Gonzales, 
347 U.S. 637, 642 (1954); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Bridges v. Wixton, 
326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269 (1905) (Brewer, J., 
dissenting).  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the view of deportation as non-penal may 
be “highly fictional.”  Trop, 356 U.S. at 98.  It constitutes an “additional punishment” for the 
same criminal conviction.  Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting).  Like denaturalization, the fact that deportation “may be imposed for purposes other 
than punishment affords no basis” for saying deportation is not, in some cases, a punishment.  
Trop, 356 U.S. at 98–99.  For example, in addition to the criminal convictions discussed in Part I, 
aliens may also be removed for their mere presence in the United States.  8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 171. See supra notes 129−150 and accompanying text. 
 172. 407 U.S. at 34. 
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actual imprisonment, the “central premise” is the same: deprivation of liberty 
is different from other penalties.173  Deportation “deprives an [individual] of 
the right to stay and work in this land of freedom.”174  In other words, it 
restrains a person’s liberty.175 
b. The Supreme Court Hinted that Silence May Be Unreasonable 
The Supreme Court has hinted that failure to advise a client regarding the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea may fall below normal levels of 
attorney competence.176  The Court acknowledged “little doubt that . . . alien 
defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely 
aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions.”177  The Court 
then underscored the importance by explaining that, in the immediate case, 
“[e]ven if the defendant were not initially aware of [immigration law], 
competent defense counsel . . . would have advised him” concerning the law’s 
importance.178 
c. American Bar Association Standards Suggest Silence May Be 
Unreasonable 
The Strickland decision explained that in determining what is reasonable, 
standards reflected by professional organizations and bar associations may act 
as guides.179  Both the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for 
Criminal Justice and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct suggest that a 
reasonably competent attorney would inform her client about the immigration 
 
 173. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). 
 174. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154. 
 175. Id. 
 176. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001).  Federal circuit courts have discussed 
St. Cyr when deciding standards of attorney competence.  United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 
1200–01 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2002).  For 
example, in Couto, the Second Circuit recently noted the Supreme Court’s “broader view of 
attorney responsibility” in St. Cyr.  311 F.3d at 187–88.  In Couto, the court did not reconsider the 
standards of attorney competence relating to failure to inform a defendant of the immigration 
consequences; however, instead, it found counsel’s performance objectively unreasonable for 
affirmatively misleading the defendant.  Id. at 188.  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its 
position that a Sixth Amendment violation does not occur when counsel fails to advise a 
defendant of collateral immigration consequences.  Fry, 322 F.3d at 1200–01 (2003).  In Fry, the 
court concluded that the St. Cyr decision had no effect on the application of the collateral 
consequences doctrine to ineffective assistance claims because “St. Cyr did not involve the 
effectiveness of counsel’s representation.”  Id.  The court stated that whether or not alien 
defendants “are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions,” deportation 
remains collateral.  Id. at 1201. 
 177. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322. 
 178. Id. at 323 n.50 (emphasis added). 
 179. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).  Strickland cautioned that these are 
guides, and only guides.  Id. 
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consequences of a guilty plea.180  This is especially true because “the most 
fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a 
situation may involve.”181 
The ABA Criminal Justice standards for guilty pleas state that “[t]o the 
extent possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the defendant, 
sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible collateral 
consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated plea.”182  The 
comments to the standard acknowledge that attorneys may not be able to 
inform clients about every probable effect of a plea, but that many times a 
client’s “greatest priority, will be the immigration consequences of a 
conviction.  To reflect this reality, counsel should be familiar with the basic 
immigration consequences that flow from different types of guilty pleas, and 
should keep this in mind in investigating law and fact and advising the 
client.”183  The comments identify other serious collateral consequences, but 
cite deportation as the “greatest potential difficulty” resulting from a guilty 
plea.184 
d. Reasonable Attorneys Inform Clients About the Essential Terms of 
the Bargain 
Fundamental fairness requires that the alien know the essential terms of his 
bargain.185  A plea bargain is just that—a bargain.  The parties, the state and 
the defendant bargain for a mutually beneficial arrangement.  The state avoids 
the cost of going to trial and the defendant receives a more predictable 
outcome.186  For an alien defendant, the bargain may involve the immigration 
consequences of the plea.  An attorney cannot be said to have acted reasonably 
if she failed to bargain for the most important term or, even worse, failed to 
inform her client that a material term was included in the bargain.  For 
example, if a defendant is bargaining to remain with his family, and his 
attorney works out a deal that avoids jail time but includes an additional term 
 
 180. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004) (“A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary to the representation.”); ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999). 
 181. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, cmt 2 (2004). 
 182. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 
1999). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67−68, 70 (1932). 
 186. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C).  Judicial economy also encourages pleas.  See Richard 
Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on Competent 
Representation and Proposals for Reform,  29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 552–64 (1988). 
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(deportation), the attorney does not act reasonably if she does not advise her 
client about the material terms of the bargain. 
Nothing in Supreme Court precedent suggests that an attorney’s silence 
about the possibility of deportation is categorically reasonable.  Instead, the 
Court’s focus on the importance of counsel when liberty is at stake, its hint 
about reasonableness in the St. Cyr decision, and its reliance on ABA standards 
as guides all indicate that an attorney’s silence is not categorically reasonable.  
Additionally, the very nature of the plea bargain suggests that silence about 
certain terms may not be reasonable. 
3. Is Nonadvice, Misadvice, or Equivocal Advice Categorically 
Unreasonable? 
Like the jurisdictions that have made a categorical determination that 
attorney silence is reasonable,187 the jurisdictions that recognize the 
“misadvice” and “maybe” exceptions188 have made categorical determinations 
that affirmative misadvice or equivocal advice are objectively unreasonable.  
Academic scholarship has encouraged the extension of this categorical 
determination to cover nonadvice as well,189 and New Mexico adopted this 
standard in Paredez.190  Such an extension, however, simply replaces one 
bright-line for another.  Instead of a categorical determination that silence is 
reasonable, silence is categorically unreasonable. 
While in some circumstances, such as the example in the introduction, an 
attorney’s silence is unreasonable for the reasons set forth above, in others, 
defense counsel’s silence about deportation can be a “legitimate” decision 
within the standard set by Strickland.  Justice O’Connor explained that “[n]o 
particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take 
account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range 
of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
 
 187. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 78−86 and accompanying text. 
 189. See, e.g., Castillo, supra note 130, at 652 (asserting that an attorney’s failure to advise 
her client of the collateral consequences “violates the competence prong of the Strickland test”); 
Cohen, supra note 36, at 1134 (stating that an attorney’s failure to inform a defendant of the 
immigration consequences is “objectively unreasonable”); Francis, supra note 78, at 733 
(proposing that “all defense attorneys determine the citizenship of all clients and inform non-
citizens of potential immigration consequences” and failure to conform would satisfy the 
Strickland prejudice prong); McDermid, supra note 76, at 769 (arguing that the correct standard 
to satisfy Strickland’s performance prong is that “counsel failed to investigate the immigration 
status of the client or the actual immigration consequences that are likely to flow from the 
conviction, or counsel did not adequately advise the client of those consequences”). 
 190. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004). 
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defendant.”191  This leeway allows defense counsel to use her judgment about 
tactical decisions and how to offer the best representation.192 
4. A Proposal for a Workable Standard 
As described above, failure to advise aliens about the immigration 
consequences from a guilty plea can constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The standard adopted by New Mexico comes to the proper result in 
all instances, but through the wrong methodology.  The Paredez standard 
suggests that an attorney always fails the performance prong when she does 
not advise her client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea,193 
but the prejudice prong would catch situations where an attorney’s nonadvice 
would be reasonable because deportation would not have been an “important 
consideration.”194 
The Paredez rule does not satisfy Strickland’s admonition that the 
“performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances.”195  Instead, the standard for analyzing the 
performance prong should be that if the possibility of deportation could have 
played any part in a defendant’s decision to plead guilty or go to trial, an 
attorney acts unreasonably when she fails to advise him. Under this standard, 
an attorney would be objectively unreasonable when she fails to investigate the 
immigration consequences and inform her client of the possibility of 
deportation only if they would affect the decision-making process.  If the 
possibility of deportation would play no role in the process, the attorney would 
have no obligation to inform the client of the immigration consequences. 
This analysis is distinct from that in the prejudice prong, which continues 
to be whether the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.  To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant would have to establish that both: 1) the possibility of deportation 
would have played a role in the decision-making process; and 2) he would not 
have pled guilty had he known about the immigration consequences.  The 
possibility of deportation could play a role in the decision to plead guilty, but 
should not be the ultimate factor. 
a. The Capital Murder Scenario 
Would an attorney fail the performance prong if she failed to investigate 
and advise her client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea that 
 
 191. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688−89 (1984). 
 192. Id. at 689. 
 193. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 194. Castillo, supra note 130, at 654–55; see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 737; 
Francis, supra note 78, at 733; McDermid, supra note 76, at 769. 
 195. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added). 
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avoids the death penalty?  Under the Paredez standard, an attorney would act 
unreasonably if she failed to advise her client about the immigration 
consequences of pleading guilty to second degree murder to avoid the death 
penalty, but the client would suffer no prejudice by his attorney’s nonadvice.  
Under the author’s proposed standard, the defendant would not be able to 
establish deficient performance so a court would never reach the prejudice 
prong. 
In this situation, the attorney’s decision not to discuss deportation is 
objectively reasonable within “the range of legitimate decisions regarding how 
best to represent” the defendant.196  When facing a capital murder charge, 
defense counsel’s primary and perhaps only mission is to avoid the death 
sentence.  To suggest that counsel would act unreasonably if she failed to 
advise her client about the immigration consequences is illogical. 
b. The Sex Crime Scenario 
Would an attorney fail the performance prong if she failed to investigate 
and advise her client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea to a 
sexual assault which results in no jail time?  Under the Paredez standard, an 
attorney, regardless of the specific facts of the case, would act unreasonably if 
she did not advise her client.197  Under the author’s proposed standard, the 
answer depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 
If the state’s case is strong and there is a likelihood of conviction at trial 
for forcible rape,198 which may result in a life sentence,199 the attorney’s 
decision not to investigate the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to 
sexual assault, which may result in no jail time,200 is not unreasonable because 
her main concern is to avoid life imprisonment. 
However, if the state’s case is weak and there may be a possibility of 
entering a plea to a lesser charge such as sexual misconduct,201 the attorney 
 
 196. Id. at 689. 
 197. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004). 
 198. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 566.030 (2000) (“A person commits the crime of forcible 
rape if such person has sexual intercourse with another person by the use of forcible compulsion.  
Forcible compulsion includes the use of a substance administered without a victim’s knowledge 
or consent which renders the victim physically or mentally impaired so as to be incapable of 
making an informed consent to sexual intercourse.”). 
 199. Id.  The penalty for forcible rape ranges from five years to life.  Id. 
 200. See, e.g., § 566.040 (2000) (“A person commits the crime of sexual assault if he has 
sexual intercourse with another person  knowing that he does so without that person’s consent.”).  
The penalty for sexual assault, a class C felony, may be up to seven years.  § 558.011.1(3) (2000 
& Sup. 2005).  Unlike forcible rape, there is no minimum so conceivably the defendant could 
receive no jail time. 
 201. See, e.g., § 566.093.1(1) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (“A person commits the crime of sexual 
misconduct in the second degree if such person: exposes his or her genitals under circumstances 
in which he or she knows that such conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.”).  The penalty for 
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may be acting unreasonably.  Even if the sexual assault conviction avoids 
prison time, it would lead to the alien’s deportation202 whereas a plea to sexual 
misconduct, even if the alien serves actual prison time, could avoid 
deportation.203  For an alien in this situation, the attorney’s decision not to 
investigate the possibility of deportation would be unreasonable. 
c. The Drug Offense Scenario 
Did the attorney in the example described in the introduction fail the 
performance prong when she failed to investigate and advise her client about 
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea?  Under both the Paredez and 
the author’s standards, she did.  The youth in the introduction bargained for a 
conviction that resulted in no jail time but received a surprise additional term: 
deportation.204  Had his attorney informed him that a guilty plea to this charge 
would lead to deportation, he might have attempted to work out another 
bargain where he pled guilty to possession of thirty grams of marijuana, served 
actual prison time, and avoided deportation.205 
In each of the above scenarios, the author’s proposed standard reaches the 
same conclusion as the Paredez standard: an attorney provides ineffective 
assistance of counsel when she fails to tell her client about the immigration 
consequences if they matter.  But only the author’s approach satisfies 
Strickland’s case-by-case analysis by allowing attorneys to use their judgment 
about how to best represent their clients. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the changes that AEDPA and IIRIRA made to immigration law, 
deportation continues to be a collateral consequence of conviction.  As such, 
courts are relieved of any obligation to inform alien defendants that a guilty 
plea may or will result in removal.  The collateral consequences doctrine, 
however, is inconsistent with the case-sensitive rule established in Strickland v. 
 
sexual misconduct, a class B misdemeanor, shall not exceed six months.  § 558.011.1(6) (2000 & 
Supp. 2005). 
 202. For immigration purposes, sexual assault is the equivalent of rape.  In re Haravasu Fifta, 
No. A90-001-497, 2005 WL 649147 (BIA Jan. 18, 2005) unpublished decision.  Rape is a 
deportable crime of moral turpitude if committed within five years of admission and a sentence of 
one year may be imposed.  KURZBAN, supra note 25, at 54, 120. 
 203. Even if sexual misconduct qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude, the alien 
would qualify for the “petty exception” because the maximum sentence is six months.  8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 558.011.1(6), 566.093 (2000 & Supp. 2005).  
Missouri’s definition of sexual misconduct would not qualify as an aggravated felony either.  §§ 
558.011.1(6) (2000 & Supp. 2005), 566.093 (2000); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(2000). 
 204. See supra notes 2−8 and accompanying text. 
 205. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000). 
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Washington.  The alternative rule, suggested by most commentators and 
adopted in State v. Paredez, that an attorney’s failure to advise her client about 
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea is categorically unreasonable, is 
equally inconsistent with the case-by-case analysis required by Strickland.  
Instead, when analyzing Strickland’s performance prong, courts should 
conclude that an attorney acts unreasonably when she fails to advise her client 
only where the possibility of deportation could have played any part in a 
defendant’s decision to plead guilty or go to trial.  The prejudice prong should 
remain unchanged: the defendant must show that but for the attorney’s act or 
omission, he would not have pled guilty. 
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